between observational statements (statements about my perceptions) and theoretical statements, which corresponds (after suitable translations) to the distinction between meaningful and meaningless statements. Moreover, given their general (and independently reasonable) allegiance to the meaningfulness of scientific theories, they need some of the deliverances of theories to be (translatable into) observational statements. 2 The search for a distinction between observation and theory was abandoned or rejected partly because of more or less 'technical' problems (e.g., the difficulty of translating statements containing dispositional terms into observational statements) and partly because of more general philosophical points, especially the so-called 'theory-ladenness of observation'.
It is becoming common to credit Hanson with the 'discovery' of the theory-ladenness of observation, and he does seem to have been the first to use the term. Referring to a drawing of an X-ray tube, he writes (1958, p. 15 
):
A trained physicist could see one thing. . . . Would Sir Lawrence Bragg and an Eskimo baby see the same thing when looking at an X-ray tube? Yes, and no. Yes-they are visually aware of the same object. No-the ways in which they are visually aware are profoundly different. Seeing is not only the having of a visual experience; it is also the way in which the visual experience is had.
Later he concludes (p. 19): "There is a sense, then, in which seeing is a 'theory-laden' undertaking. Observation of x is shaped by prior knowledge of
x."
However, the idea that observation somehow involves theory was around before 1958. One finds, for example, the following passage from Einstein (1949, p. 669 
):
What I dislike in this kind of argumentation is the basic positivistic attitude, which from my point of view is untenable, and which seems to me to come to the same thing as Berkeley's principle, esse est percipi. "Being" is always something which is mentally constructed by us, that is, something which we freely posit (in the logical sense). The justification of such constructs does not lie in their derivation from what is given by the senses. . . . One may not merely ask: "Does a definite time instant for the transformation of a single atom exist?" but rather: "Is it, within the framework of our theoretical total construction, reasonable to posit the existence of a definite point of time for the transformation of a single atom?"
Einstein had been arguing that quantum theory is incomplete because it fails to specify (even after the fact) a precise time at which a single atom makes a decay. His statement here is in reply to the assertion that no such time exists, because it cannot be empirically determined. Einstein 'observation' refers to a personal experience, and the point is that the content of the personal experiences that we would call 'observations' is determined in part by whatever theories, or more generally whatever relevant beliefs, we may have, in particular about the physical world. The passage from Hanson is therefore closely related to a passage from Kuhn (1962, p. 111 Kuhn qualifies his claim that 'after a revolution scientists work in a different world' (p. 135), and rightly so, for the point most plausibly established by Kuhn's argument is that the content of their experiences-even in cases where we would take them to be responding to the 'same external stimulus'-is different. We may add that practically, they live in different worlds, but the point is that their experiences are qualitatively different. (Both Hanson and Kuhn are also concerned with how language affects how we perceive the world, a concern that is not central here.) Einstein, on the other hand, is clearly not concerned with the experiences of scientists. His point is, rather, that theory determines what it is, and is not, reasonable to assume to exist. Einstein's claim is not about the experiences of scientists, nor about how holding a theory causes one to organize sense data, but instead his claim is about the relationship between theory and physical fact (and therefore, ultimately, observation), independent of whether anybody believes the theory, of whether anybody observes the facts in question, and of the manner in which holding a theory influences how one sees the world.
Of course, the two points are related, but I emphasize the difference between them because, as I shall argue, Einstein's way of putting the point raises a more serious problem for understanding the existence of observationally equivalent theories.
In any case, theory-ladenness raises serious problems for any attempt to make a strong distinction between observation-statements and Hence we need not allow the existence of theory-independent observation-sentences. Rather, we need only acknowledge the existence of a translation-or isomorphism-from one theory's 'empirical substructure' to another's.
I will suggest that van Fraassen's strategy is more obviously useful in the case of the Hansonian and Kuhnian problem than in the case of the Einsteinian one. However, it will help, first, to make explicit some distinctions that thus far have been implicit. First, we may distinguish between psychologistic and scientific uses of 'observation'. In the first sense, 'observation' refers to the experience of an individual. Although observation in this sense still involves external objects-observations are always observations of something-the referent of the word is a personal experience, so that two people can observe the same object, and yet have different observations.
In the second sense, 'observation' is an achievement-word, whose referent is an event, the conditions for whose occurrence are given by a scientific theory, if only loosely or indirectly. How, for example, do we know that the usual methods for measuring spin are insufficient in the case of a free electron? Quantum theory tells us: in this case, the magnetic field generated by the motion of the charged electron invalidates the result. (Of course, the conditions laid down by the theory are quite general, and do not specify, for example, how to build an apparatus to make the observation.
Nonetheless, to settle a dispute about whether an observation of a given phenomenon has in fact been made, one appeals more or less directly to theoretical considerations.)
A second distinction is between the observation itself and the report of that observation, an 'observation-sentence'.
We have, then, four senses of 'observation', and when discussing 'theory-ladenness of observation' we should say which sense of 'observation' is being used. Let us take them one at a time.
Reports of psychologistic observations are of course given in words, and to the extent that the words used are 'theory-laden', the reports are. However, as many have pointed out, such reports can be stripped of their theoretical overtones to a remarkable degree. For example, rather than reporting that she observed the diffraction of the beam to be 5 millimeters, a person can report that she observed the needle (the long skinny object) on top of the '5'.
Indeed, as Hanson (1958, p. 20) pointed out, when scientists become confused about the theoretical meaning of an observation, they sometimes resort to such descriptions: "it is green in this light; darkened areas mark the broad end." The point is also implicit in Duhem (1914, p. 218 This passage again makes clear that we can strip observation-reports of theory. The resulting report may continue to have different meanings, and evoke different impressions, for different people-you may think of your father who worked in an iron works every time you here 'iron bar', so that the words in the report remain, in a sense, 'laden', but they are no longer laden by the theory that the reported observation is supposed to test or illustrate.
Psychologistic observations themselves (as opposed to reports of them) are formed by theory too. Indeed, as I have suggested, the arguments of Hanson and Kuhn are best seen as arguments that psychologistic observations are theory-laden. In the end, however, we must recognize two limitations of those arguments. First, they are based on psychological theories that have since been called into question. Second, because one can recognize stripped-down descriptions of one's own psychologistic observations as nonetheless descriptions of that observation, it seems that we can translate from one person's psychologistic observations to another's.
Scientific observations present more difficult problems. First, reports of scientific observations are, of course, couched in the language of the theory.
There is no obvious way to report that you observed the resistance of a spool without using terms whose meanings are given in large part by the theory of electrical resistance. Second, scientific observations themselves are defined largely in terms of the theory in question, precisely because theory is responsible for determining the conditions under which the observation can be said to have been made.
Let us return to van Fraassen. Because theories, on his view, are sets of models (ways the physical world could be) and not sentences, he need not worry about the difficulties raised by theory-ladenness of observation-reports. Van Fraassen is right to focus on observations rather than observation-reports. Indeed, our interest in observations is presumably occasioned by an interest in the nature of evidence, and of course sentences are not evidence (usually), but report it. Moreover, although understanding psychological observations may be important for studying the epistemology of observational evidence, scientific observations are at the heart of our concern, for they are the evidence for scientific theories. (I am assuming that there is such a thing as 'objective evidence' for scientific theories, and I may be wrong, in which case the only sort of evidence we might have consists of psychological observations.)
Hence, for example, the evidence for quantum theory consists in our having been able to confirm many of the observations predicted by the theory.
In the next section, I'll describe one such observation, perhaps clarifying the meaning of the term 'scientific observation'.
Underdetermination
There is a debate about whether rival scientific theories are ever (or 'very long') equally supported by the evidence, but there is little debate about whether they are equally supported by the observational evidence, and good thing, because examples abound. For example, there is an alternative (originating with Lorentz) to 'orthodox' relativity, which clearly produces the same predictions but which differs on the 'metaphysical' question of the existence of a preferred frame of reference. But perhaps the most spectacular example is the alternative to orthodox (non-relativistic) quantum theory due to de Broglie and Bohm. Rather than discuss this example in detail, it will be more useful to consider just one experiment, to see how the observational underdetermination works there.
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The example is quantum tunneling. In classical mechanics, a particle can be 'trapped' by a potential 'barrier'. Consider, for example, a ball in a valley between two hills. Assuming the kinetic energy of the ball is sufficiently small, it will not be able to escape the valley-balls do not roll uphill on their own. In quantum theory, however, objects can escape similar barriers, even if they lack sufficient kinetic energy. This phenomenon is called 'tunneling'.
In quantum theory, one describes tunneling as follows. The wavefunction of the particle 'trapped' by potential barriers will extend beyond the barriers-it will be non-zero in regions beyond the barriers. But wherever the magnitude of the wavefunction is non-zero, there is a non-zero probability of finding the particle. Hence, there is a chance of finding the particle outside the barriers.
How do we understand tunneling in the orthodox quantum theory-the 'Copenhagen interpretation'? The key point is that, in this interpretation, a particle cannot have a precise position and momentum (hence kinetic energy, taken as momentum-squared divided by mass) at the same time. So, suppose that we localize the particle between the barriers. In doing so, we render momentum (hence energy) not merely unknown to us, but in fact unpossessed at all by the particle. But then there is no paradox; there is no need to explain how the particle could get past the barrier, for there is no energy that it has, and specifically it has no energy less than what is 'needed' to get past the barrier. Strange? Yes, but that's the Copenhagen interpretation.
Bohm's theory tells a different story. According to it, particles have two kinds of energy, the usual (classical) energy, and energy due to a 'quantum observational evidence for (or against) a scientific theory is garnered by our ability (or inability) to confirm the scientific observations predicted by a theory. Moreover, the point of calling two theories 'observationally equivalent' is to suggest that the observational evidence is the same for both. But this answer to the first question only makes an answer to the second the more difficult, for we have also seen that theory-ladenness of scientific observations is the most difficult to overcome.
Perhaps, then, we should reconsider the claim that scientific If 'the light at the end of the tunneling' is taken to refer to a psychological observation, then 'no'. We my well wonder (along with, e.g., Cartwright) whether either theory can be used by itself (without the aid of questionable approximations or extra phenomenological laws) to predict the effect at the detector, but in any case we can be certain that neither theory predicts anything about psychological observations. Perhaps, then, at least each of these theories together with some theory of perception does the job? Perhaps, but it is hard to see how, for any such theory of perception must 'recognize' the very observational equivalence we seek to understand, by recognizing that a Bohmian flash and a Copenhagen flash are-at least as far as their effect on perception is concerned-the same thing. The most optimistic hope we could have is that someday, some theory will accomplish this feat, but again, it is hard to see how, without the theory's being told (by us) that Bohmian and Copenhagen flashes are 'the same'.
But perhaps I am being unfair. After all, both theories say that 'a particle' gets through the barrier, right? So while they may differ on the explanation of how, or why, a particle gets through, they agree on the conclusion anyway, taken now not as a psychological observation but as a scientific observation. But the point is that they do not obviously agree on the conclusion, because the very notion of a particle is different in the two cases.
In the Copenhagen theory, for example, a particle is the sort of thing that can have a position at one time, but not at another, while Bohmian particles have a position at every time. How do we know that a Copenhagen particle's 'hitting the detector' amounts to the same thing as a Bohmian particle's 'hitting the detector'? And of course the problem is even worse, because what it means to 'hit a detector' (or indeed, to be a detector) is itself different in the two theories. 
Towards a solution
Another way to ask the question of the previous paragraph is to ask how one identifies 'relations' amongst the observations of one theory with those of another. This way of putting the question indicates both where van Fraassen's account helps, and where it needs help. It had been thought that empirical equivalence must amount to agreement on observation-statements.
I have suggested that (scientific) observations themselves are where agreement must lie, but even that way of putting the point is misleading.
Indeed, given that scientific observations are more or less definitionally theory-laden, agreement on them in the most straightforward sense is in general impossible. As van Fraassen's account makes clear, however, all that is really needed is some 'legitimate translation' from the scientific observations of one theory to those of another. To put it somewhat more mathematically, we require a 'structure-preserving map' from one theory's (scientific) observations to another's. between mathematical formalism and interpretation (which, therefore, one may not wish to term a 'distinction'), for it may turn out that while one can think about the formalism without considering the interpretation, one cannot also think about the interpretation without thinking, in some way, about the formalism.
Another reason to believe that such a distinction can be drawn is that formalism often leaves open interpretation. We have already seen a spectacular example: both the Bohm theory and the Copenhagen theory can be stated (though the former not conveniently) in the language of the theory of complex analysis and Hilbert space, and yet they provide distinct, indeed in some ways contradictory, accounts of tunneling (and the world in general).
There are also some reasons to believe that observational equivalence has as a necessary condition a shared formalism. I have already given, somewhat elliptically, one such reason. If you believe that observational equivalence does not (because of some form of theory-ladenness) amount to having shared observations, then something like van Fraassen's strategy (of finding an isomorphism from the observations of one theory to those of another) seems required. But, the very notion of an isomorphism does not seem to make sense outside of a formal context, where one can define the notion of 'structure' in a way that makes it clear what it would mean for a map to 'preserve structure'. In other words, the objects that are mapped by the isomorphism must be mathematical, or be represented mathematically, so that they are capable of having 'structures' that can be said to be preserved by the isomorphism. Second, concerning the claim that observational equivalence requires a shared formalism, a great deal more needs to be said. One might suppose, for example, that the relevant sort of isomorphism exists between just the 'observational parts' of the 'observationally equivalent' theories. Of course, this supposition requires, again, some way of distinguishing observational from non-observational parts of a theory, and part of the value of my suggestion (that that observational equivalence requires a shared formalism) is that it may eliminate the need for drawing such a distinction. Nonetheless, I have thus far provided only a rather convoluted reasons for accepting this suggestion. I will add here only that every alternative to special or general relativity can be expressed in the same formalism as those theories, and again, every alternative to the standard 'Copenhagen' version of quantum theory can be expressed in the language of Hilbert space.
To review: I have supposed, in this paper, that the following two theses are true: observations (in each of the senses described) are theory-laden, in some way or other; and there are observationally equivalent, but otherwise distinct, theories, where 'observation' here means 'scientific observation'. I have argued that it is not clear how both of these theses could be true, and I have suggested that the solution to this puzzle lies in agreeing with van Fraassen that observational equivalence amount to the existence of some sort of translation from one theory to another (as opposed to 'identity' of observations). In particular, I have suggested that the proper relation is expressibility in a shared formalism.
I have run quickly past several subtleties that would have to be addressed in a longer account. For example, I have not considered the case where two theories are only partially distinct, so that there is a more or less straightforward 'translation' from one to the other in the case of at least some observations. Nor have I considered observationally equivalent theories that are each underwritten by more fundamental theories. Investigation of these and related points must await another day.
